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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
BENJAMIN D. NICOLA*
The subject is that of an ancient and great profession, medi-
cine. This subject has, however, been a bone of contention between
both lawyer and doctor, so actually both professions are involved.
The question is whether their relationship will be such that they
must contest with each other, or whether they may by investigation
and research, try each in its own way to solve their mutual prob-
lems. May not each enter into that ancient fellowship for some-
thing more than private gain and thus become an instrument to
advance the cause of Justice?
That the inquiry be worthwhile we will start at the beginning
and first consider the relation of physician and patient.
THE RELATION OF PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
The practice of medicine is in its broadest sense, the practice
of the art of healing diseases and preserving health. Thus, when a
licensed practitioner undertakes to treat a patient, and in so doing
does it badly, a right of action for malpractice arises. The legal
relation of the physician and patient is founded upon the theory
that the former is learned, skilled and experienced in subjects about
which the latter knows little or nothing. These subjects are how-
ever of the most vital importance and interest to the patient, as
upon them may depend the health, or even life, of himself or his
family. Of necessity, the patient must place great reliance, faith
and confidence in the professional word, advice and acts of his
attending physician.
Because of this relationship between physician and patient, it
is essential to a complete understanding of the law of physicians
and surgeons as it relates to the liability of medical practitioners
for malpractice, that preliminary consideration be given to certain
general fundamental principles having to do with the elements of
the relation. These elements include: the creation and nature of
the relation, its continuance and termination, and the particular
duty of good faith and fair dealing of the physician with his patient.
It must first be noted that a physician is under no duty to engage
in practice or to accept professional employment. However, once
* Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
1 Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Bergeron, 25 F2d 680 (8th cir. 1928); 41
Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 70, 71 (1939).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
he accepts a patient for the purpose of medical or surgical treatment,
the legal relation of physician and patient is created.' Physicians
and surgeons of a hospital, public or private, enter into this legal
relation upon the admittance of any patient.
The existence of the relation is a matter of fact, depending
upon whether the patient entrusted himself to the care of the
physician and whether the physician accepted the case. Once hav-
ing undertaken the care of a patient, the law imposes upon the
physician the obligation of exercising due care and the amount of
skill common to his profession and commensurate with his position.
2
The standard of skill and care will be considered in more detail
later.
Because a physician occupies a position of trust and confidence
as regards his patient, it is his duty to act with the utmost good
faith. If he knows that the treatment adopted by him will prob-
ably be of little or no benefit, and there is an available treatment
which is more likely to be successful and which he does not have the
training or facilities to give, he must advise his patient of these facts.
His failure to do so and the continuance of his former unsuccessful
treatment constitute a breach of his professional duty to his patient.3
A physician is also under a professional obligation in making
a disclosure to his patient concerning the latter's condition, to make
known the results of the treatment administered, the possibility
of cure, etc. He must speak and relate fairly and truthfully at the
peril of being held liable in actions for damages for fraud and
deceit.4
It is the welfare of the citizens of a state, and therefore of the
state itself, that demands that those persons practicing medicine and
surgery shall be duly able and careful.5 It is public policy to protect
the health and lives of the people, particularly the weak or credu-
lous, the ignorant or unwary, from careless, unskillful, or negligent
medical practitioners. This is partially accomplished by making
such practitioners answerable in damages to their patients for fail-
ure to employ the required care, skill, or knowledge in the per-
formance of their professional duties and undertakings."
Universally, it is the duty of an attending physician or surgeon
2Tveldt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
3 Ibid.
4 23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 75 (1939).
G Stevenson v. Yates, 183 Ky. 196, 208 S.W. 820 (1919).
0 Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51; 187 P. 282 (1920); Thaggard v. Vafes, 218
Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1929) ; Dunn v. Beck, 80 Mont. 414, 260 Pac. 1047 (1927) ;
Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888) ; 41 Am. jur. Physicians and
Sureonts § 78 (1939).
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to use reasonable care and skill for the safety and well being of his
patients. In the absence of any statute, the common law holds
every physician or surgeon answerable for injury to his patient re-
sulting from want of the requisite knowledge and skill, the failure
to use reasonable care and diligence, or the failure to exercise his
best judgment under the attending circumstances. The duty of a
physician or surgeon to bring skill and care to the amelioration of
the condition of his patient does not rise from contract, but has its
foundation in public considerations which are inseparable from the
nature and exercise of his calling. The relation existing between
physician and patient is, as seen above, the result of a consential
transaction, and not necessarily one of contract. Thus, such duty
is not affected by the fact that the service rendered is gratuitous, 7
or by the fact that the physician was employed by a third person
with no contractual relation existing between the physician and the
patient.8
GENERAL STANDARDS OF SKILL AND CARE
A physician is liable to his patients for failure to exercise requi-
site skill and care. Thus, a physician must possess that reasonable
degree of learning, skill and experience which ordinarily is possessed
by others of his profession. He must exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence in the exertion of his skill and the ap-
plication of his knowledge. He must exert his best judgment as to
the treatment of the case entrusted to him. In short, a physician
must use such care, skill and diligence as physicians and surgeons
in good standing in the same locality and in the same general line
of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like cases.9 The terms
"physician" and "surgeon" are used interchangeably by the courts.
There is apparently no attempt, so far as this point is concerned,
to distinguish their respective liabilities.'0 The practitioner is equally
responsible in either case whenever an injury results from want of
skill or care.'1
A physician is not absolved from liability for failure to exercise
proper skill in a particular case by the fact that the result is as good
as is usually obtained in like cases. Neither is he absolved by the
7 Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916); Hansen v. Pock,
supra note 6.
8 National Say. Bank of D.C. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Carpenter v.
Walker, 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910) ; Vilta v. Fleming, supra note 7.
9 Palmer v. Humiston, 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N.E. 283 (1913); Dabney t. Briggs,
219 Ala. 127, 121 So. 394 (1929); Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Conn. 209, 23 Am. Dec.
333 (1832); Hallam & Barnes v. Means, 82 Ill. 379, 25 Am. Rep. 328 (1876).
10 Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107 P. 252 (1910).
11 Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 77 Am. Dec. 72 (1860).
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fact that the same result would have ensued if he had not treated the
patient. 2 The law does not require of the physician and surgeon
that they possess and use the utmost degree of care and skill at-
tainable or known to the profession. The law exacts only that they
possess and exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and
care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their pro-
fession under the same or similar circumstances.' 3  The physician
and surgeon are not held to the standard of a thoroughly educated
or well educated man of their profession. They are not required to
exercise at all times their best skill and ability. The law recognizes
that no one can always be at his best, and their conduct is subjected
to a test by a reasonably extraordinary standard. 4 The standard
contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all
known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most
to the least experienced. It is the reasonable average merit among
ordinarily good physicians. 5 However, the fact that the best of
physicians commit a certain act does not render the like act of a
defendant physician one plainly non-negligent and thus take it
away from the jury. The required degree of skill and care is not
increased by the refusal of the physician to accept assistance in his
diagnosis of a case,"' or by his refusal to call in a consultingphysician, provided he uses his best judgment.
STANDARDS AS DETERMINED By PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES
Although the standards of skill and care which a physician
must exercise in the treatment of a patient are very general in their
scope and application, it is obvious that injustice might result from
a rigid and undeviating uniform application of these standards to
all practitioners without regard to special conditions or particular
circumstances. Accordingly, the law takes into account such mat-
ters as the difference in the several schools or systems of medicine,
the existing state of medical knowledge, the locality and place of
practice, and the limitations which attend the practice of a special
or limited branch or system of the healing art. All these considera-
tions must be weighed in determining whether in a particular case
12 Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902) ; Granger v. Still, 187 Mo.
197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
13 Patten v. Wiggan, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am. Dec. 593 (1862); Pike v. Honsinger,
155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898); Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wash. 2d 168, 100 P.2d 201
(1940).
14 Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 194 Pac. 488 (1920); Dorris v. Warford,
124 Ky. 768, 100 S.W. 312 (1907).
15 Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
16 Potter v. Warner, 91 Pa. 362, 36 Am. Rep. 668 (1879).
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the physician has acted with the requisite ability, skill and care in
treating his patient.
School of Medicine
In law a physician is entitled to have his treatment of his
patient tested by the rules and principles of the school to which he
belongs. A person professing to follow one system or school of
medicine cannot be expected to practice other than in accordance
with his school. He is not answerable for bad results so long as he
performs the treatment of his patient with skill and care according
to the teachings of his school or system.1 7  This general rule has
been applied to practitioners of the schools of homeopathy, allo-
pathy, psychopathy, chiropractic and Christian Science healing."'
There is authority, however, ,to the effect that a limited practitioner,
even though unlicensed, must satisfy the test of learning, skill, and
care of the average practitioner in the locality rather than that of
the average practitioner of his own school where his treatments in
the particular case are within the field of general medicine or sur-
gery. 9 The general rule has also been limited by the qualification
that the school must be a recognized school of good standing. It
must have established rules and principles of practice for the guid-
ance of all of its members as respects diagnoses and remedies which
each member is supposed to observe in any given case. Thus, one
who treats diseases solely by clairvoyance has been held not to be
within the general rule on the ground that clairvoyance having no
established rules or principles of practice, cannot be considered as
a recognized school of medicine.20
State of Medical Knowledge and Established
Modes of Practice
The law recognizes that medical service is a progressive science.
In determining the degree of care and skill which the law exacts of
physicians and surgeons, regard must be had to the state of advance-
ment of the profession at the time of -the treatment. Such treat-
ment is to be measured by the standards existing at the time in
question and not those which may have existed at some time in the
past. 1 It is not negligence for a physician or surgeon to use methods
recognized as proper by the profession generally, although it is a
'7 Forthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
18 Spead v. Tomilson, 73 N.H. 46, 59 Atl. 776 (1904).
19 Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927); Hilgedorf v.
Bertschinger, 132 Ore. 641, 285 Pac. 819 (1930).
20 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888).
21 Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 856 (1902).
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duty of a physician or surgeon to keep up with the advancement
made by his profession. It is also his duty to refrain from trying
experiments on his patients. It is incumbent on him to conform
to the mode established by his school of practice for the treatment
of given conditions. If he departs therefrom, he does so at his own
peril.
A physician may adopt new methods as they are approved by
the profession.22 This qualification gives to the profession the op-
portunity to make progress after the experimental stages in the de-
velopment of a new method. However, it does not authorize the
trying of untested experiments on patients. If an experiment is
tried on a patient, it is at the financial risk of the physician rather
than of the patient. More recently it has been held that the duty
of a physician to bring to his patient better, more advanced, or more
favorable modes of treatment, facilities, training, or special skill
than he himself, or the community in which he practices can af-
ford, is measured by existing conditions of rapid transportation and
an easy means of communication rather than by those of the past.23
Locality or Place of Practice
The character of the locality or neighborhood in which the
medical art is practiced has an important bearing upon the requisite
degree of skill and care that is required of the physician. In view
of the difference in opportunities, expense, and conditions of practice
between densely and sparsely populated communities, a physician's
liability should be measured by a like standard to that of the com-
munity in which he practices.
In determining what constitutes reasonable and ordinary care,
skill, and diligence, the test is that which physicians and surgeons
in the same general neighborhood have and exercise at the time in
like cases. In some of the decisions a physician or surgeon is held
only to that degree of diligence, learning, and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons of the particular locality where he practices.
However, because the standard may be exceptionally high or ex-
ceptionally low in a particular community, it is the sounder rule
that the requisite standard of skill and care should be determined
not by that of the particular locality, but by the standards of the
physicians of ordinary skill, and care, in similar communities.24
Some courts have refused to set any standard based on locality
of practice and have instead said that among the circumstances to
22 Miller v. Toles, 183 Mich. 252, 150 N.W. 118 (1914).
23 Tvedt v. Haugen, supra note 2.
24 Mutchman v. Petry, 46 Ohio App. 525, 189 N.E. 658 (1933).
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be considered is the location of the physician in the place of his
practice, rather than in some other place.2 5 There is authority that
a general practitioner in a small town is not held to the same high
degree of art and skill in surgery attained by those in larger cities
making a specialty of surgery.
28
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS TO TREATMENT
Previously, consideration has been given to the professional
obligation of a physician to his patient. Emphasis has been given
to his general duty of care to the patient, the general standards of
skill and care, and to the effect thereon of particular circumstances.
The following law concerns the application of the rules and stand-
ards there discussed, to the various phases of treatment of a patient
by his physician or surgeon as indicated under the following head-
ing:
Diagnosis
It is one of the fundamental duties of a physician to make a
properly skillful and careful diagnosis of the ailment of a patient. If
he fails to bring to that diagnosis the proper degree of skill or care,
and makes an incorrect diagnosis, he may be held liable to the
patient for the damages thus caused. He is as liable as he would
be for the application of improper treatment.2 7  While a physician
or surgeon does not insure the correctness of his diagnosis, his re-
sponsibility in diagnosing a patient's malady is to use ordinary skill
and diligence in applying the means and methods ordinarily and
generally used by physicians of ordinary skill and learning in the
practice of the profession, to determine the nature of the ailment
and to act upon his honest opinions and conclusions.
As a means of illustrating these general rules, it may be neg-
ligence for a physician to treat an injury as a bruise where there are
positive symptoms of which he is aware indicating that the injury
is a fracture or dislocation. In some jurisdictions, however, the
general rule is subjected to the qualification that an incorrect
diagnosis is not actionable unless followed by improper treatment. 8
It has been held that a physician is not liable to a patient for a
mistaken diagnosis if the treatment administered was proper for the
patient's actual malady, or if the treatment administered caused no
injury to the patient and the injury or discomfort suffered resulted
solely from the patient's malady.29
25 Viita v. Fleming, supra note 7.
26 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 368 (1879).
27 Paulson v. Stocker, 53 Ohio App. 229, 4 N.E.2d 609 (1935).
28 Just v. Littlefield, 87 Wash. 299, 151 Pac. 280 (1915).
29 Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So. 2d 610 (1941).
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Ordinarily the physician or surgeon is not liable for making an
incorrect diagnosis where it is made in good faith and there is rea-
sonable doubt as to the nature of the physical conditions involved,
or as to what should be done in accordance with recognized author-
ity and good current practice. The same is true where a diagnosis
is made in good faith, on observation of the patient and based upon
physical evidence of symptoms which would warrant such diagnosis
by a reasonably prudent and informed physician, even though the
physician in question did not prescribe for the patient and was not
his attending physician.30
Use of X-ray or Other Aids or Tests
It has been held that a physician or surgeon is negligent in
failing first to ascertain that his patient is in a condition to undergo
safely a proposed treatment or operation before proceeding, where
such treatment or operation may involve risk or danger to the
patient. However, to prove negligence, it must be shown that the
recognized professional standards of skill and care and the existing
state of medical knowledge require the making of tests or examina-
tions which are generally accepted by the profession before under-
taking the proposed treatment or examination. The circumstances
of a given case may, of course, render the general rules inoperative.
Such would be the case where no competent physician has made the
requested examination or tests of the patient before sending the
patient to the physician in question for treatment of a specified
nature."' To restate the foregoing, it has been held that failure to
use X-rays in a case of doubt may render a practitioner liable for
damages for injuries resulting therefrom where the tenets of such
practitioner's school call for the use of such X-rays as an aid in the
diagnosis in cases of doubt, and where the conditions are similar to
those in the case in suit. Failure of a physician consulted as to a
possible foreign substance in an eye to use an opthalmoscope to
make an X-ray picture of the eye, is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. A surgeon is not negligent as a matter of law in amputating
an arm without first making an X-ray examination where the
mangled and shattered condition of the elbow was apparant to sight
and feeling so that an X-ray examination would have aided nothing,
and three physicians had agreed on consultation that the amputa-
tion was necessary.32 In all such cases, it is essential that the negli-
30 McGuire v. Anyx, 317 Mo. 1061, 297 S.W. 968 (1927).
31 Sweeney v. Erving, 35 App. D.C. 57, 43 L.R.A. (n.s.) 734 (1910).
32 Jachovach v. Yocon, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
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gence of the physician shall have been the proximate cause of the
patient's injury to render him liable in damages.'3
Preliminary and Preparatory Treatment
It is incumbent upon a physician or surgeon, in the exercise
of due and reasonable care and skill, to inform himself by the proper
test and examination of the condition of his patient to undergo a
proposed treatment or operation. He must do this intelligently,
and exercise the skill of his calling. The question of whether or not
his failure to make such test or examination in a particular case
constitutes want of due and reasonable care and skill, depends upon
whether the standards of skill and care earlier stated required such
test or examination in the particular case.
The failure of a specialist to make any test before administer-
ing treatment has been held to have been justified where the patient
had been under the treatment of a competent surgeon who recom-
mended the treatment in question. Negligence of a surgeon can-
not be predicated on his failure to make a certain preliminary test
to ascertain the hazard of a dangerous operation about to be per-
formed on a patient, where it does not appear that want of such
test contributed to the patient's death during the operation, or that
such tests were ever made in similar operations in that vicinity.3
Where proper examinations are made by the surgeon prepara-
tory to operating he has been held not answerable as for negligence
in failing to discover a condition which made extra hazardous the
giving of the anesthetic used.-'
The Use and Administration of Anesthetics
The duties and liabilities of a physician or surgeon in admin-
istering an anesthetic to a patient are substantially the same as
those which govern him in treating a patient generally. He is bound
to exercise such reasonable care and skill as is usually exercised by
average physicians or surgeons of good standing in the community
in which he practices. The surgeon is charged with the duty of
acting on his best bona fide judgment, and is not liable for injuries
or death resulting without negligence from honest errors of judg-
ment. It has been said however that the surgeon is liable if his
mistake of judgment is so gross as to constitute negligence.
Surgical Operations
A surgeon who undertakes to perform a surgical operation is un-
33 Lippold v. Kidd, 126 Ore. 160, 269 Pac. 210 (1928).
34 Harvey v. Richardson, 91 Wash. 245, 157 Pac. 674 (1917).
35 Loudon v. Scott, supra note 14.
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der the duty to exercise such reasonable care, skill, and diligence
as is usually exercised by surgeons in similar cases. The rule exacts
a higher degree of skill and care of a surgeon who specializes in
surgical operations than is required of the average general prac-
titioner of medicine. The operation begins when the incision is
made and ends when it is closed. The duty to exercise such care,
skill and diligence exists throughout the whole operation. 6
Leaving Foreign Substances in a Wound
Many cases of malpractice arising out of surgical operations
result from the leaving of surgical sponges, gauze, or other foreign
substances in the wound after it is closed. This, it is said, is at least
prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.3 7 There are many
cases which take the view that the failure of a surgeon to remove
all sponges or foreign substances from a surgical wound is negli-
gence per se.3
Postoperative Treatment
An operating surgeon must, after performing an operation,
exercise the same care and skill in subsequent necessary treatment
until the patient's recovery, as in performing the operation. This
is true unless the terms of employment otherwise limit these services
or the patient gives notice that he cannot or will not afford the
subsequent treatment.3 9
Instructions as to Care and Treatment
After Cessation of Attendance
It is a physician's duty, although his actual personal service
is completed, to give to the patient proper instructions regarding
the future treatment of a yet not completely cured ailment. It is
his further duty to warn and instruct persons having the care of
the patient, if they are ignorant or inexperienced, as to the per-
formance of the duty which they have undertaken.
Diligence in Visiting or Treating Patient
It is a physician's right, in the first instance, to determine the
frequency of his professional visits to the patient. If the latter
accepts the physician's services and does not discharge him or limit
36 Palmer v. Humiston, supra note 9.; Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 21.
37 Palmer v. Humiston, supra note 9.
38 Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 233 (1919); Ault v. Hall, 119
Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1926).
39 Ales v. Ryan, 54 P2d 782, (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); Smith v. Zeagler, 116 Fla.
628, 157 So. 328 (1934); McCormick v. Jones, 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181 (1929).
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the times and number of his visits, the patient cannot thereafter
object to the number of visits made. Unless the relation of physi-
cian and patient has been legally terminated, it is the duty of the
attending physician to use reasonable care and skill in determining
the frequency of his visits and use diligence in making those visits.
Professional Judgment and Cure Not Guaranteed
The doctrine is well settled that the general practitioner of
medicine or of surgery does not, in the absence of special contract,
impliedly warrant the success of his treatment or operation. He
warrants only that he possesses and will carefully apply, such pro-
fessional skill and learning as are ordinarily possessed by general
medical practitioners in the locality in which he practices.40
The law does not raise from the fact of employment an implied
undertaking to cure, only an undertaking to use ordinary skill and
care. Even the fact that the unfortunate result might have been
avoided does not render a physician liable if he used during his
attendance proper skill and care and his best judgment.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that, in Ohio, the doctor performing an
operation is held and has always been held to the ordinary degree
of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the same pro-
fession.41 Moreover, the law of Ohio has become stabilized regard-
ing the liability of hospitals for the negligence of their employees,
as well as the liability of doctors generally for the negligence of
their assistants.42 At the same time the author is of the (perhaps
hopeful) opinion that more cases are being settled and that fewer
cases are being brought for their nuisance value than ever before.
40 Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 21; Bowers v. Santee, supra note 38.
41 Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 21 ; Bowers v. Santee, supra note 38, at 361.
42 Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E2d
765 (1960) ; Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E2d 410 (1956) ;
Rudy v. Lakeside Hosp., 115 Ohio St. 539; 155 N.E. 126 (1926); Taylor v. The
Protestant Hosp. Ass'n., 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911) ; Koubeck v. Fairview
Hosp.; Civil No. 690, 589 C. P. Cuyahoga Co. (1960); No. 25,391, 8th Dist. Ct.
App. (Ohio, 1960). A case of more than usual interest which is representative of
the Ohio law is Morgan v. Sheppard, No. 26,076, 8th Dist. Ct. App. (Ohio, 1963).
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